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EXECUTIVE ORDERS are a historically rich phenomenon and ex-
tend as far back as George Washington.1 While executive orders are
not expressly enumerated under the Constitution, the chief executive
has traditionally relied on them for a variety of purposes.2 Since 1789,
American presidents have used executive orders in some form to im-
plement foreign policy and to aid federal administrative agencies in
discharging their inherent duties.3 Perhaps the most well known exec-
utive order was President Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclama-
tion, which effectively outlawed slavery on September 22, 1862.4
Over time, presidents have contributed to the transformative and
flexible nature of executive orders. In the burgeoning years of the
United States, executive orders were merely interpretive in purpose.
However, such narrow use did not last for long. American Presidents
from Abraham Lincoln to Franklin Roosevelt vastly transformed the
nature of executive orders.5 Their presidencies were critically unique
because they occurred during times of great social inequality. During
these periods, executive orders began to take on many legislative char-
acteristics because of the wider prevalence of social inequities.6 In
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4. Id. at 340.
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fact, in the nation’s most challenging times, executive orders have
been an indispensable tool to effectuate social change during times of
economic and racial strife.7 For example, President Franklin
Roosevelt guided our country through the Great Depression and
World War II. During his presidency he issued an astonishing 3,723
executive orders.8 Moreover, some of President Franklin’s executive
orders even created critically important governmental agencies such
as the National Labor Board and War Powers Board.9 In the first half
of the Twentieth Century, presidents started to view executive orders
as potential change agents to bring about sweeping social reforms.10
Indeed, the political mechanism known as the “executive order”
has been used throughout American history to implement policy
changes and clarify law in many contexts. Executive actions have his-
torically been used in the context of civil rights and, specifically, in the
area of employment rights. In carrying on this tradition, in July 2014,
President Barack Obama extended public sector employment protec-
tions to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gen-
der identity.11 However, while advocacy groups perceived this
executive action as a victory for LGBT employees,12 President
Obama’s Executive Order 13672 merely maintains discrimination
against LGBT employees in much of the private sector and thereby
allows much of the LGBT-based employment discrimination to con-
tinue unabated. In any event, a historical and constitutional analysis
suggests that political leadership and executive enforcement powers
can lawfully converge, in order to use the president’s inherent unilat-
eral powers to issue an executive order that extends Title VII liability
to include sexual orientation and gender identity protections in the
private sector. Such an order would serve Title VII’s larger goals of
smoking out employment discrimination and ensuring equal employ-
ment opportunities regardless of an employee’s immutable
characteristics.
In offering a protective and effective solution for all LGBT em-
ployees, this Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I will provide a
comprehensive introduction to the reasons why the LGBT community
7. Id. at 344.
8. Id. at 339–40.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 343.
11. With Executive Order, Obama Takes His Place in History, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN
(July 21, 2014), http://www.hrc.org/blog/with-executive-order-obama-takes-his-place-in-
history [https://perma.cc/8W6V-AZPX].
12. Id.
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continues to suffer private sector employment discrimination. Part II
of this essay will provide a detailed constitutional background to exec-
utive orders. As such, Part II will explore what an executive order is,
how the president derives such unilateral power to exercise this execu-
tive authority, and how executive orders have shaped civil rights in the
employment context starting in the 1940s. Part III proposes a com-
monsense solution for the president to use an executive order to pro-
vide equal employment protections to LGBT employees in the private
sector. This Comment will conclude in Part IV by highlighting the
reasons why an executive order is the best way to solve the inequity
problem and why this common sense solution is the most effective,
rational, and quickest way to render Title VII equality to all LGBT
employees.
I. The Problem
To understand the critical importance of extending LGBT-based
protections to all employees under Title VII, one must first under-
stand the three approaches that have failed to provide these protec-
tions and how together these failures have created employment
discrimination problems for LGBT employees in the private sector.
Specifically, these three distinctly identifiable causes operate at the
federal level and have undoubtedly contributed to the problem in
their own unique fashion. These three causes need to be unpacked
and examined in order to illustrate the legal and political underpin-
nings of the problem.13
13. Additionally, the current patchwork of state non-discrimination laws undoubtedly
exacerbates the problem discussed in Part I. However, Part I of this essay focuses solely on
the federal causes that created the current levels of LGBT-based discrimination in the pri-
vate sector. There should also be awareness that the political and legal ambivalence to-
wards LGBT-based employment protections has emboldened conservative states to pass
anti-gay legislative measures. Compare Non-Discrimination Laws: State-by-State Information—
Map, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.org/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-
information-map (last visited Feb., 2017) [https://perma.cc/LJZ9-KGFX], with Non-Dis-
crimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-
maps/non_discrimination_laws (last visited Feb., 2017) [https://perma.cc/2B3N-U3W7],
and Jeff Guo, That anti-gay bill in Arkansas actually became law today. Why couldn’t activists stop
it?, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/
2015/02/23/that-anti-gay-bill-in-arkansas-actually-became-law-today-why-couldnt-activists-
stop-it/ (illustrating Arkansas anti-gay law passed in February 2015) [https://perma.cc/
C8JD-8PKQ].
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A. Title VII Fails to Expressly Provide LGBT Protections
The first cause that can be attributed to the absence of full em-
ployment discrimination protections for the LGBT community is evi-
denced by the fact that federal courts have been reluctant to extend
full protection to suits involving claims of sexual orientation or gen-
der identity discrimination. This judicial phenomenon can be directly
traced to the plain language of Title VII.14 The statute expressly pro-
vides that any discrimination “because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin” is prohibited.15 Thus, because the
statute does not explicitly provide for sexual orientation or gender
identity protections on its face, judges are hesitant to find broader
interpretations. Because the plain language of Title VII merely bars
“sex discrimination,” a majority of courts hold that it does not pro-
hibit employment discrimination on account of sexual orientation or
gender identity. As such, this phenomenon is the main reason why
most federal courts are reluctant to engage in progressive statute read-
ing to assist LGBT plaintiffs.
While Title VII’s prohibitions do not explicitly encompass gender
identity or sexual orientation, the Supreme Court disregarded that
notion in its landmark decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.16 In Price
Waterhouse, the respondent Ann Hopkins was a senior manager at the
petitioner’s accounting firm.17 In 1982 she was proposed for part-
ner.18 Initially, while Hopkins was not denied nor granted partner,
her partnership decision was put on hold for reconsideration the fol-
lowing year. Ultimately, the firm denied her the position.19 Hopkins
brought suit under Title VII alleging sex discrimination because dur-
ing her tenure she was subject to numerous forms of gender stereotyp-
ing.20 She also alleged that comments made on account of her gender
motivated the firm’s decision to deny her partnership promotion.21
In affirming the lower courts’ findings in favor of Ann Hopkins,
the plurality held that “for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we
are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with
14. See The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2015).
15. Id.
16. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244–45 (1989).




21. Id. at 235.
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their group.”22 Whether one considers Ann Hopkins’s sex as the “but-
for” cause of her denial is irrelevant. The Court held that whenever
employers consider sex as a factor in employment decisions, those de-
cisions violate the plain language of Title VII.23 Reasonable logic
would conclude that gender stereotyping is just another way to de-
scribe discrimination based on someone’s sexual orientation, gender
identity, or maybe both.
Furthermore, lower court readings of Title VII post-Price
Waterhouse suggest hesitancy and confusion in application of the
proper legal standard involving claims of gender stereotypes. To be
clear, federal courts post-Price Waterhouse still rely on very narrow statu-
tory interpretations to act as the gatekeeper to exclude the majority of
LGBT-type claims.24 Professor Brian Soucek has written extensively on
this LGBT-based phenomenon under Title VII.25 Soucek notes that,
“[o]n the one hand, beliefs about sexuality often, if not always, involve
gender stereotypes regarding who men and women should be at-
tracted to.”26 Yet, federal courts are often wary of being regarded as
judicial legislators and therefore discharge their duties quite cau-
tiously. For those claims that lie outside traditional notions of sex ster-
eotyping, federal courts usually deny Title VII protections to litigants
seeking to prevail on claims of sexual orientation or gender
discrimination.27
Many cases illustrate the hesitancy and tension on the part of fed-
eral courts to apply broader interpretations of Title VII’s “sex” prong.
One case that illustrates such judicial refusal is Dawson v. Bumble &
Bumble.28 In Dawson, the plaintiff tried to adhere to a theory of Title
VII protection due to her failure to “comply with socially accepted
gender roles” and as such she argued that she was a member of a
protected class under the statutory scheme.29 The Second Circuit ex-
pressly rejected such a broad reading of Price Waterhouse30 and held
22. Id. at 251.
23. Id. at 240.
24. Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough For Title VII, 63 AM. U. L.
REV. 715, 717 (2014).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 731.
27. Id.
28. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005).
29. Id.
30. See generally id. (reinforcing the notion of the unwillingness of courts to extend
Title VII past its statutory text); but see, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (Justice Bren-
nan writing for the Court noted that “Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”).
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that homosexual plaintiffs cannot “bootstrap” coverage for sexual ori-
entation into Title VII.31 Thus, such narrow readings of Title VII often
leave LGBT-based employment discrimination claims without legal
redress.
Nonetheless, a few brave federal judges have been courageous
enough to extend full Title VII protections to the LGBT community.
In a case where the EEOC brought a Title VII action on behalf of a
gay ironworker, the traditionally conservative Fifth Circuit expressly
followed the Supreme Court’s precedent in Price Waterhouse.32 In
EEOC v. Boh Bros. Construction Co., the employer hired the plaintiff
Woods to work on bridge reconstruction after Hurricane Katrina in
late 2005.33 The EEOC decided to bring a hostile workplace claim on
behalf of Woods. The Commission alleged that the plaintiff was sub-
jected to severe and pejorative treatment at the hands of fellow con-
struction workers that included vulgar language and same-sex
harassment.34 Co-workers mocked Woods for his alleged use of
WetOnes instead of toilet paper, perceiving this behavior as undenia-
bly feminine.35 One of his harassers even approached the plaintiff
from behind and simulated intercourse with him.36
Affirming the district court’s findings in favor of Woods, the Fifth
Circuit held that “a plaintiff may establish a sexual harassment claim
with evidence of sex-stereotyping.”37 Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that
the EEOC may rely on evidence that Woods’ supervisor viewed him
“as insufficiently masculine to prove its Title VII claim.”38 However,
the outcome reached in Boh Bros. is unfortunately an outlier and un-
common in Title VII jurisprudence. As previously noted, most federal
courts adhere to a rather restrictive and straightforward interpretation
of Title VII. However, society’s current perceptions of homosexuals
and workplace discrimination tend to suggest that the application of
Title VII in Boh Bros. was the correct outcome.
In determining the legal underpinnings for broader social jus-
tice, it is imperative that the federal trial courts and appellate courts
take doctrinal hints from the Supreme Court. Yet, that philosophy has
not been legally or politically prescient. Even the liberal Ninth Circuit
31. Id.
32. EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., L.L.C., 731 F.3d 444, 456 (5th Cir. 2013).
33. Id. at 449.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 450.
36. Id. at 449.
37. Id. at 456.
38. Id.
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has refused such broad readings of Title VII. In DeSantis v. Pacific Tel.
& Tel. Co., Inc., three gay men filed a suit alleging workplace discrimi-
nation based on their homosexuality; the court applied a narrow read-
ing of Title VII and held that “Congress had only the traditional
notions of ‘sex’ in mind” when it codified the law.39 Therefore, be-
cause gay and lesbian plaintiffs suffering anti-gay discrimination in the
workplace based on their effeminacy, homosexuality, or trans-sexual-
ity do not comport with traditional notions of sex stereotyping, their
claims do not “fall within the purview of Title VII.”40
Thus, many deserving LGBT plaintiffs who are victims of sex dis-
crimination are barred from Title VII protections in federal court.
This narrow judicial approach is inherently unfair because courts that
deny such coverage refuse to step outside the box and consider alter-
native theories to ensure equal Title VII protections for both genders
regardless of sexual orientation. In essence, such a narrow reading of
Title VII by federal courts does nothing more than indirectly promote
deeply entrenched homophobia and bare animus against members of
the LGBT community in private workplaces.
B. Congressional Inaction With Their Failure to Pass
Comprehensive Non-Discrimination Legislation
The second contributing factor to unequal LGBT-based employ-
ment protections is Congress’ failure to progressively amend Title VII.
By 2007, Congress considered two versions of the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (“ENDA”).41 The original ENDA bill would have
prohibited employment discrimination based on sexual orientation
and gender identity under Title VII.42 After House leaders felt that
there would not be enough bipartisan support to pass the original
version that covered transgender persons, a second version of ENDA
was introduced that extended coverage to sexual orientation.43 Since
2007, several variations of ENDA managed to pass only through one
house of Congress. In November 2013, the Senate passed a version of
ENDA (S. 815) but the House failed to pass the measure.44 The fed-
eral legislature, which is often idealized throughout primary school
39. DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th
Cir. 1979).
40. Id. at 332.
41. Stephanie Rotondo, Employment Discrimination Against LGBT Persons, 16 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 103, 137 (2015).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 138.
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curricula as voices for the people, continuously fails to heed the voices
of their constituents that ask for equal LGBT-based employment pro-
tections on the federal level.
Various advocacy groups continue to call for strategic bipartisan
legislation to afford equal employment protections for all LGBT em-
ployees under federal law.45 However, the current state of congres-
sional ambivalence surrounding LGBT rights highlights the struggle
and tension the LGBT community must face until an effective solu-
tion is reached. It is imperative during this time of congressional un-
certainty that the Executive Branch exercise its inherent leadership
powers in order to focus the national conversation on the plight of
LGBT employees in America’s workspaces.
C. President Obama’s Executive Order Excludes Most LGBT
Employees From Discrimination Protections
A third cause of insufficient LGBT employee protections is Exec-
utive Order 13672. On July 21, 2014, President Obama issued this or-
der, which extended public sector and government contract
employment discrimination protections to include both sexual orien-
tation and gender identity.46 Although this order was perceived as a
victory for the LGBT community, it provides private sector LGBT pro-
tections insofar as LGBT employees may become subject to federal
government contracts. Thus, even though Executive Order 13672
helped to shed light on the need for employment discrimination pro-
tections across the board under Title VII, many members of the LGBT
community continue to face discrimination in private sector
workplaces.47
This shortcoming certainly leaves much to be desired, especially
considering that almost five percent of the national workforce consists
of people who identify as gay, lesbian, transgender, or bisexual.48 Be-
cause it only narrowly amended Executive Order 11246 as to federal
45. Id.
46. Exec. Order No. 13672, 79 Fed.Reg. 141, 42971 (July 23, 2014).
47. Ian Johnson, America’s 10 Worst LGBT Work Insults, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Oct. 28,
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ianjohnson/americas-ten-worst-lgbt-w_b_6054808
.html [https://perma.cc/CL6X-77DG].
48. Christy Mallory & Brad Sears, Employment Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity in Kansas, UCLA WILLIAMS INSTITUTE (Sept. 2015), http://williamsinsti-
tute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Kansas-ND-September-2015.pdf [https://perma
.cc/PJH6-LPQ5].
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contractors,49 Executive Order 13672 is another critical reason why
the LGBT community continues to suffer from widespread employ-
ment discrimination in the private sector. Such limited executive or-
ders also tend to complicate matters for lawmakers because they fail to
send the right political signals to precipitate further legislative protec-
tions, and they further entrench political divisiveness.50
II. Background to Executive Orders: Historical,
Constitutional, & Case Law Perspectives
To understand the ability of the President to issue executive or-
ders that ensure equal LGBT employment protections under existing
statutory framework, one must first examine the constitutional under-
pinnings that allow the President to issue such executive orders. Many
scholars disagree as to the precise constitutional provision that pro-
vides the executive with the express authority to announce policy
changes that wield the full force and effect of legislative actions. Exec-
utive orders are quasi-legislative in nature and cover a vast array of
topics such as public lands, mineral reserves, civil rights, emergency
economic situations, and removal of federal employees.51 Presidents
and litigators often look to the Constitution to locate the exact provi-
sion that provides the power for executive orders.52
A. What Is An Executive Order and Where Does This Power Come
From?
The president in part derives the power to issue executive orders
from several places in the Constitution.53 Because many executive or-
ders deal with military matters, scholars also look to the constitutional
power assigned to the president as Commander-in-Chief as the au-
thority for executive orders issued during war.54 Other clauses in the
Constitution that arguably support “executive legislation” during
49. David Hudson, President Obama Signs a New Executive Order to Protect LGBT Workers,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (July 21, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/07/21/presi-
dent-obama-signs-new-executive-order-protect-lgbt-workers [https://perma.cc/7W8Y-
5KX8].
50. Chris Johnson, Rubio pledges to reverse Obama’s LGBT executive order, WASHINGTON-
BLADE, (Dec. 6, 2015), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/12/06/rubio-pledges-to-
reverse-obamas-lgbt-executive-order/ [https://perma.cc/WS3T-9T7D].
51. Duncan, supra note 1, at 343, 345–49.
52. Id. at 366–67.
53. John E. Noyes, Executive Orders, Presidential Intent, and Private Rights of Action, 59
TEX. L. REV. 837, 841 (1981).
54. Id. at 839–40.
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peacetime are quite vague in regard to providing the president with
explicit unilateral legislative power. This ambiguity results in disputes
about the permissible scope and nature of unilateral executive
actions.55
Generally speaking, Article II of the Constitution sets forth the
contours and fundamental responsibilities of the president within the
Executive Branch.56 A logical starting point in understanding the con-
stitutional source for executive orders begins with Article II, section
three of the Constitution.57 Here, the Constitution expressly provides
that the executive “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted.”58 While the Constitution delegates to Congress the inherent
responsibility to make laws, the separation of powers doctrine assures
laws are properly interpreted by the Judiciary and enforced by the Ex-
ecutive Branch.59 Within this framework, the president acting as the
chief administrator is charged by the Constitution to effectuate equal
governance and execution of the laws passed by Congress.60 Another
key inquiry surrounding executive orders is the Supreme Court’s in-
terpretation of the executive’s inherent constitutional and statutory
powers to make unilateral policy decisions. The Supreme Court’s an-
swer to the aforementioned query has produced two co-existent rules
that are used to interpret the legality of executive orders.
B. Supreme Court Precedent Defines Constitutionality of
Executive Orders
To help interpret the constitutional boundaries of executive or-
ders, the Supreme Court articulated two guideposts — the doctrine of
congressional acquiescence and the theory of statutory outer limits —
that help define the scope and limitations on unilateral presidential
actions. As the use of executive orders expanded over time, it was inev-
itable that the Supreme Court needed to interpret the constitutional
limits of the Executive Branch.
55. See id.; see also Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive
Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 2 (2002) (arguing that the increased use of
executive orders and other presidential directives is a fundamental problem in modern-day
America).
56. Noyes, supra note 53, at 842.
57. Id.
58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
59. Noyes, supra note 53, at 841–46.
60. Id. at 841–42.
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1. The Doctrine of Congressional Acquiescence
Over many decades the doctrine of congressional acquiescence
has become an important foundational pillar for executive author-
ity.61 In United States v. Midwest Oil Co., the Supreme Court expressly
found in favor of the government under the congressional acquies-
cence doctrine.62 In Midwest Oil Co., the challenged provision was an
executive order that reserved oil-rich lands for public use and preser-
vation, which previously were set aside for private purchase by an act
of Congress.63 These lands were highly attractive for private exploita-
tion because they contained oil and other precious minerals.64 Before
the challenged executive order was issued, congressionally earmarked
lands were purchased and exploited so quickly in locations such as
California that the Director of the Geological Survey informed the
Secretary of the Interior that the public would soon cease to own any
petroleum-laden lands.65 Upon recommendation from the Secretary
of the Interior, President Taft issued an “executive proclamation.”66
On September 27, 1909 President Taft issued an order that aimed to
prevent further private exploitation of public lands.67 President Taft’s
proclamation was entitled “Temporary Petroleum Withdrawal No. 5,”
and it expressly directed a list of publicly owned lands to be withdrawn
from the 1897 legislation.68
Six months after the proclamation, the predecessors in interest to
the respondents moved onto public land in Wyoming with the pur-
pose of oil exploration.69 In response to the land grab, the United
States Attorney in Wyoming filed a complaint in district court that
asked for the return of the land deed to the United States and re-
quested damages worth 50,000 barrels of oil that were unlawfully ex-
ploited after President Taft’s order.70 The district court granted the
oil company’s motion to dismiss and the Government appealed the
61. Duncan, supra note 1, at 374.
62. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 465 (1915).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 467.
65. Here, this executive order is referred to as a “proclamation” because it predates
the point at which the government numbered and published executive orders in the Fed-
eral Register.
66. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 468.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 467.
70. Id. at 467–68.
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case to the Eighth Circuit, which certified the questions to the Su-
preme Court.71
The oil company challenged the validity of President Taft’s with-
drawal order before the Supreme Court.72 The Government argued
that the President was well within his constitutional power to “with-
draw, in the public interest, any public land from entry or location by
private parties.”73 In opposition, the oil company argued that “there is
no dispensing power in the Executive, and that he could not suspend
a statute or withdraw from entry or location any land which Congress
had affirmatively declared should be free and open to acquisition by
citizens of the United States.”74
The Supreme Court did not make a legal determination as to
whether “the President could have withdrawn from private acquisition
what Congress had made free and open to occupation and purchase”
but only felt compelled to consider the legal consequences that
flowed “from a long-continued practice to make orders like the one
here involved.”75 The Court focused on the fact that before 1910
there were over 200 executive orders issued by American presidents
that reserved government owned lands for public use.76 The Court
also focused on the fact that these orders were issued without any ex-
press or implied approval by Congress.77
Most importantly, the Court acknowledged that Congress had
quietly “acquiesced” to 252 executive orders regarding land use prior
to 1910.78 The most salient portion of the Court’s opinion stipulated
that “[b]oth officers, lawmakers, and citizens naturally adjust them-
selves to any long-continued action of the Executive Department, on
the presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed
to be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice.”79 The
Court recognized that because the oft-repeated use of executive or-
ders to effectuate change that touched third parties was persistent for
so long, these executive orders were to be treated as de facto legislation





75. Id. at 469.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 470–71.
78. Id. at 471.
79. Id. at 472–73.
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While the Ninth Circuit questioned the central holding of Mid-
west Oil Co.,80 no federal court decision has overturned the notion that
unchecked executive orders are presumed to have the full force and
effect of the law absent a determination to the contrary. The decision
in Midwest Oil Co. indicates that executive orders are to be presumed
lawful, even though such power may be subject to investigation.81 Ex-
ecutive orders supported by statute or the Constitution that are un-
scathed by the legislature and the courts should be treated as law.82
Therefore, by executive order, the President has inherent unilateral
power to use the executive’s role to set national policies as long as
these policies adhere to the separation of powers doctrine.
2. Statutory Limits On Executive Power
Although the Constitution affords the President and the Execu-
tive Branch tremendous latitude in the enforcement decisions of legis-
lative actions, the Supreme Court has overturned executive orders
that run afoul of established statutory parameters.83 In fact, the Su-
preme Court has overturned executive orders only twice.84 In Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,85 the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 10340 which directed the
Secretary of Commerce to seize the nation’s steel mills in order to
ensure that a national labor strike would not impede the flow of arma-
ments for the Korean War effort.86 The government argued that Presi-
dent Truman used his combined constitutional powers as Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief to avoid a national disaster due to
an inevitable stop in steel production.87 In opposition, the steel mills
argued that President Truman’s directive was actually executive law-
making, and this type of conduct undoubtedly exceeded his constitu-
tional bounds.88
In Youngstown, the Court acknowledged that President’s Tru-
man’s power to issue such a sweeping directive must “stem either from
80. United States v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328, 1338 (9th Cir. 1983) (calling into ques-
tion the central holding of Midwest Oil, that historical acceptance and governmental effi-
ciency will not save a practice if it is contrary to the Constitution).
81. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 473 (if the Constitution leaves a question of power in
doubt, “contemporaneous and continuous subsequent practical construction” is decisive).
82. Noyes, supra note 53, at 841–42.
83. Duncan, supra note 1, at 337.
84. Id.
85. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
86. Id. at 582–84.
87. Id. at 582.
88. Id.
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an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”89 President Tru-
man had two statutory provisions to order government takings under
certain conditions, but the government conceded that these condi-
tions were not satisfied before President Truman directed the
seizures.90 Furthermore, with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act91
(Labor-Management Relations Act) in 1947, Congress explicitly pre-
empted governmental seizures as a lawful method to resolve labor-
based disputes.92 Thus, President Truman not only lacked explicit au-
thorization from Congress to direct seizure of the nation’s steel mills,
but his decision undoubtedly acted in direct contradiction to federal
labor law.93
Because President Truman’s action was constitutionally and statu-
torily perverse, the Supreme Court had no other choice but to strike
down the order. The steel mills clearly had the superior arguments
and the superior position in the litigation surrounding President Tru-
man’s executive order. Not only did his decision run afoul of laws
enacted by Congress, his decision also directly undermined his inher-
ent duty expressly charged by the Constitution to ensure that the laws
be “faithfully executed.”94 Thus, any executive order that attempts to
usurp the executive’s power to overstep the traditional statutory
boundaries established by Congress is unconstitutional.95 The Youngs-
town decision certainly helped to define the executive’s role within the
separation of powers framework and signaled that zealously issued
presidential directives that exceed established statutory and constitu-
tionally assigned duties may be ripe for vacatur when challenged.96
The second case in Supreme Court jurisprudence to overturn an
executive order involved a dispute between employer associations and
the government in regard to a replacement worker and strike provi-
sion contained within the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).97
In Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, several employer associations chal-
lenged President Clinton’s Executive Order No. 12954, which pre-
cluded the government from contracting with third-parties who hired
89. Id. at 585.
90. Id. at 585–86.
91. See generally, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2015).
92. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586.
93. Id. at 585–86.
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
95. See Duncan, supra note 1, at 376.
96. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586–89.
97. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996) [here-
inafter “Reich”].
Issue 2] EXECUTIVE ORDERS 327
full-time replacement workers during lawful labor strikes.98 The as-
sociations argued that President Clinton’s executive order not only
exceeded his constitutional powers, but it also expressly contradicted
provisions of the NLRA.99 The government argued that despite the
strong NLRA arguments on the merits, federal courts did not have
jurisdiction to review President Clinton’s executive order.100
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court focused on the unde-
niable tension between the President’s executive order and the
NLRA.101 The Court expressly held that the President may make
broad policy determinations that fall within his inherent powers
under the Procurement Act102 that “deal with government contrac-
tors’ employment practices—policy views that are directed beyond the
immediate quality and price of goods and services purchased.”103 Yet,
the Court held that the President does not have authority to issue ex-
ecutive orders that are expressly pre-empted by the NLRA and would
effectively supplant Congress’ express power to legislate laws that im-
pact organized labor and related employment considerations.104
The Youngstown and Reich cases were exceptional decisions be-
cause federal courts traditionally interpret executive orders under a
strong presumption of validity.105 Federal courts, including the Su-
preme Court, have traditionally given deference to a president’s au-
thority to issue executive orders.106 As such, the Supreme Court has
only been willing to overturn remarkably few executive orders that
run contrary to legislative schemes or that upset traditional limits on
executive’s power as outlined in the Constitution.107 Thus, federal
courts operate under a separation of powers assumption that the pres-
ident’s actions are inherently aligned with congressional intent unless
contradicted by express statutory language brought under a legal
challenge.108
When combined with the doctrinal rules from the above-dis-
cussed cases, the separation of powers rubric held by the Supreme
Court suggests that the president wields a maximum amount of execu-
98. Id. at 1324.
99. Id. at 1325; see also 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2015).
100. Id. at 1325–26.
101. Id. at 1333.
102. See 40 U.S.C. § 486(a) (2015).
103. Reich, 74 F.3d at 1337.
104. Id. at 1337–39.
105. See Duncan, supra note 1, at 365.
106. Id. at 376.
107. Id. at 337.
108. Id. at 364–65, 376.
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tive order authority when Congress delegates the Executive Branch a
quasi-explicit framework within which to issue “presidential legisla-
tion.” The Supreme Court affords the broadest deference to executive
orders that complement existing legislative provisions.109 At other
times, the President’s executive order power is most restricted when it
only stands on constitutional authority without statutory support or
congressionally delegated approval.110 In any event, the President’s
political leadership and executive enforcement powers may lawfully
converge in order to use the executive’s inherent unilateral powers to
issue executive orders that clarify legal protections and announce en-
forcement decisions that fall within the “zone of interests” of already
existent federal statutory schemes.111 As the relevant case law suggests,
as long as the questioned executive order does not run afoul of estab-
lished statutory provisions, Congress always has an opportunity to re-
but the presumption of legality by legislative action.112 Otherwise,
congressional acquiescence suggests that the executive’s decision is
implicitly ratified through temporal legislative inaction.113
Challenges to presidential orders may only be upheld if it is un-
reasonable and illogical to construct a reasonable interpretation of
the relevant statute that complements the executive order in ques-
tion.114 The notion of reasonableness often aggregates with the doc-
trine of non-justiciability115 to guide judicial interpretations of
executive orders. Such deferential interpretive practices by federal
courts produce a distinct legal phenomenon, which may be correctly
characterized as a judicial “hands-off” approach towards executive or-
der scrutiny.116 Additionally, congressional acquiescence further af-
fords broad deference to questionable executive orders.117 In contrast
to the executive orders challenged in Youngstown and Reich, executive
orders that seemingly contradict legislative decisions have been up-
held under the doctrine of congressional acquiescence.118 Similar to
109. See generally id. at 348.
110. Id. at 348–49, 363.
111. Id. at 334.
112. Id. at 369.
113. Id. at 367, 375.
114. Id. at 376.
115. Simply, a doctrine of judicial restraint that the limited jurisdictional powers of
federal courts should not be wasted on adjudicating “political” questions that should be
left to the political branches of government to decide.
116. See Duncan, supra note 1, at 376; cf. Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngs-
town, 343 U.S. at 589.
117. See Duncan, supra note 1, at 363.
118. Id. at 374.
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the affirmative defense of laches,119 congressional acquiescence acts
as a type of tacit approval that gives legal effect to executive orders
that otherwise may be challenged in a court of law. In the employ-
ment context, a long history of executive orders that extended equal
employment rights to private employees harkens back to President
Franklin Roosevelt.120
C. Executive Orders Covering Civil Rights in “Employment” &
Notable Legal Challenges
In the 1930s and 1940s, a socio-political and activist leadership
coalition headed by President Roosevelt put in place an effective pro-
totype to Title VII.121 During this time, African-American groups pro-
tested the segregated defense industries.122 In response to these
demonstrations, federal personnel agencies sent letters to defense
contractors that asked them to eliminate discriminatory employment
practices.123 Additionally, civil rights activists planned a march on
Washington, D.C., to bring public attention to the employment plight
of African-Americans involved in the war effort.124 President Roosevelt
gave in to their demands and issued Executive Order 8802.125 Sup-
porters remarked that it was the most significant document since the
Emancipation Proclamation.126 Executive Order 8802 created the Fair
Employment Practices Committee (“FEPC”).127
As a civil rights effort initiated by President Roosevelt and Execu-
tive Order 8802, the FEPC attempted to smoke out employment dis-
crimination in the private sector by holding hearings on the status of
discrimination in each major geographical region throughout the na-
tion.128 However, the FEPC came under political opposition, lacked
financial resources, and suffered numerous key leadership resigna-
119. Deirdre R. Wheatley-Liss, Doctrine of Laches means you are “Out of Time”, LEXISNEXIS,
(Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/estate-elder/b/estate-elder-
blog/archive/2012/01/26/doctrine-of-laches-means-you-are-quot-out-of-time-quot.aspx
[https://perma.cc/CK8E-WNKA].




123. Id. at 1178–79.
124. Id. at 1179.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1179; see also Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (2015).
128. Ontiveros, supra note 120, at 1180.
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tions.129 Fearing that the FEPC was ineffective due to the political cli-
mate, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 9346 that
reinvigorated the FEPC by reestablishing it as an independent agency
that reported directly to him.130
The reinvigorated FEPC performed exceedingly well in the mid-
1940s by protecting African-American employees from the harms of
employment discrimination in the Alabama shipyards.131 Although
less than ideal for the progressives of the time, the FEPC directly con-
ferred employment benefits in private employment by ordering the
promotion of African-Americans into welder positions.132 The FEPC
also effectively provided equal opportunities to African-American em-
ployees who were eligible for promotions and subsequently integrated
them into their respective trades after decades of discriminatory
treatment.133
1. James v. Marinship Corporation
Prominent NAACP lawyer Charles Houston litigated civil rights-
based employment discrimination cases before the FEPC and federal
courts.134 Despite the successes of the FEPC in the south, employers
and labor unions such as the American Federation of Labor
(“AFL”)135 openly chose to ignore its orders.136 Labor unions and em-
ployers openly resisted the consequences that flowed directly from the
decisions of the FEPC.137 There are two cases of critical importance in
regard to legal challenges to executive orders that conferred civil
rights in the employment context.
First, the Supreme Court of California recognized the legal au-
thority of President Roosevelt’s Order 9346 in James v. Marinship Corpo-
ration.138In Marinship, plaintiff James and other similarly situated
African-American workers brought an action to enjoin the defendants
from discharging them because they were not members of a labor





133. Id. at 1180–81.
134. Id. at 1181.
135. American Federation of Labor, now part of the labor organization known as the
AFL-CIO.
136. Ontiveros, supra note 20, at 1182.
137. Id. at 1181–82.
138. See generally James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721 (Cal. 1944).
139. Id. at 724.
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the trial court order awarding the employees a preliminary injunc-
tion.140 The shipyards were owned by the United States and operated
by the defendant shipbuilder under a contract that prohibited em-
ployment discrimination on account of race, color, creed, or national
origin.141 The unions at issue had closed shop agreements with the
shipbuilder to exclusively fill its labor needs.142 Moreover, these un-
ions did not allow African-Americans to become fully carded members
but required them to join other local auxiliary unions to become eligi-
ble for employment with the shipbuilder.143 The plaintiffs refused to
join these other unions for work clearances and the unions
threatened them with termination for failure to comply with their
demands.144
The workers argued that the unions’ demands would result in a
breach of the shipbuilder’s non-discrimination contract with the Mari-
time Commission.145 They further argued that it would be contrary to
law and public policy for the court to condone such prejudicial treat-
ment.146 The defendants contended that a union may arbitrarily close
its membership to otherwise qualified persons and at the same time
may, by enforcing a closed shop contract, demand union membership
as a condition of employment.147 The defendants also argued that the
plaintiffs were not subject to the non-discrimination clause in the con-
tract because they were not members of the union that had the closed
shop agreement with the shipbuilder.148 The court found in favor of
plaintiffs by looking to the Railway Labor Act, the National Labor Re-
lations Act, and the implications that flowed from such statutes.149
Specifically, the court held that each labor union that is selected to
bargain on behalf of its employees has a duty to exercise fairly, impar-
tially, and without discrimination because of race.150 Further, in addi-
tion to running afoul of state and federal labor provisions, the court
tried to square such discriminatory practices with President
Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9346 and its implications for the full par-
140. Id.
141. Id. at 725.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 726.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 730.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 735, 739.
150. Id. at 736.
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ticipation of all persons in the war effort, regardless of race, color,
creed, or national origin.151
In sum, the court held that the defendants’ discriminatory poli-
cies not only ran afoul of state and federal labor laws, but the policies
were directly contrary to President Franklin Roosevelt’s national non-
discriminatory employment policies set out by Executive Order
9346.152 Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court’s order en-
joining defendants from discriminatory employment and labor prac-
tices.153 Marinship is a seminal case because the legality of executive
orders in the civil rights employment context was upheld as Califor-
nia’s Supreme Court gave broad deference to President Roosevelt’s
directive. Most critically, Marinship signaled to both public and private
employers that executive orders effectively set national policy initia-
tives that have real legal consequences against discriminatory
behavior.154
In the subsequent decades following the decision in Marinship,
the early to mid-1960s was a time of widespread social revolution. Chil-
dren born in the years immediately following World War II were com-
ing of age and challenging societal norms imposed by their elders.
During this time many racial minorities remained subject to discrimi-
nation in employment. Like the FEPC era, the federal government
continued help abolish patterns of social inequity because society de-
manded it.155 The FEPC provided an important legal and practical
framework to confer social equality by weeding out employment ineq-
uities in the private sector.156 Similar to the successes of the FEPC, the
Philadelphia Plan helped desegregate the skilled trade unions, al-
lowing equal employment access to the drastically underrepresented
African-American trade members.157
On September 24, 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Ex-
ecutive Order 11246, which charged federal agencies with establishing
equal employment programs.158 This order also established require-
ments for non-discriminatory hiring and employment practices by fed-
151. Id. at 741.
152. Id. at 742.
153. Id. at 744.
154. Id. at 742; see also Ontiveros, supra note 120, at 1182.
155. David F. Engstrom, The Lost Origins of American Fair Employment Law: Regulatory
Choice and the Making of Modern Civil Rights, 1943-1972, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1071 (2011).
156. Id. at 1120–21.
157. David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand On Equal Employment Op-
portunity Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1141–43 (1989).
158. Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 24, 1965).
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eral government contractors.159 Executive Order 11246 in
conjunction with anti-discrimination efforts by the Department of La-
bor came to be known as the Philadelphia Plan.160 The goal of Order
11246 was to desegregate the trade unions of five counties in the east-
ern Pennsylvania region.161 Order 11246 expressly proscribed contrac-
tors from discriminating on the basis of race, creed, color, or national
origin.162 It also required contractors to take affirmative steps to im-
plement in-house procedures to ensure equal employment opportu-
nity free from racially motivated practices.163
2. Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of
Labor
Similar to the unpopular effects of President Roosevelt’s FEPC on
private sector shipbuilders in Northern California highlighted in James
v. Marinship Corp., several labor associations brought a federal court
challenge against Executive Order 11246. In Contractors Association of
Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor (“Contractors”),164 several con-
tractors and labor organizations challenged the regulations promul-
gated by the Secretary of Labor under the directives announced in
Executive Order 11246.165 The plaintiffs challenged the codified labor
regulations that required “[f]ederal contracts and federally assisted
construction contracts contain specified language obligating the con-
tractor and his subcontractors not to discriminate against any em-
ployee or applicant for employment because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.”166 Executive Order 11246 also imputed conse-
quences against third party employers because it imposed “various
sanctions on the contractors which include the cancellation, suspen-
sion or termination of contracts and the debarment of a contractor
from further Government contracts.”167
159. Id.; see also Rose, supra note 157, at 1143 (discussing how Executive Order 11246
evolved in 1970, when the Secretary of Labor incorporated timetables and numerical goals
in what became known as ‘Order No. 4’, which was subsequently codified into an official
regulation issued by the Department of Labor. See 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-2 (1988)).
160. See Rose, supra note 157, at 1141–43.
161. Id. at 1141.
162. Exec. Order No. 11246, supra note 158, at section 202.
163. Id.
164. Contractors Ass’n of Eastern Pennsylvania. v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F.Supp.
1002, 1004. (E.D. Penn. 1970) [herein “Contractors”].
165. Id. at 1004–05.
166. Id. at 1005.
167. Id.
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The labor organizations and contractors challenged Executive
Order 11246 on the assumption that it violated both the Constitution
and laws passed by Congress.168 The main legal questions that sur-
rounded the action was “whether or not the provisions of the Philadel-
phia Plan for commitment to specific goals for minority group
participation is in conflict with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.”169 Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the Philadelphia
Plan contradicted the express provisions of Title VII because Order
11246 required them to “hire and employ on the basis of and with
regard to race, color and national origin.”170 The government argued
that the contractors openly discriminated against minorities that were
regarded as protected classes under Title VII.171 In effect, Order
11246 simply required private contractors subject to government con-
tracts to comply with Title VII.172 In reaching its decision the court
articulated the existence of “[t]hirty years of executive mandates
[that] have been enunciated and their validity is established.”173 The
court also looked “to the initial executive order relative to discrimina-
tory practices first enunciated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in
1941 and by his successors in office.”174 While relying on the under-
pinnings of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII’s prohibitions,
the court implicitly reaffirmed the doctrine of congressional acquies-
cence because there was “no doubt that the authority to issue the ap-
plicable executive orders will withstand any assault.”175 Thus, the
legality of using executive orders to confer private sector equal em-
ployment opportunities and protections was unequivocally reaffirmed
in Contractors.176
Prior to the decision in Contractors that upheld Executive Order
11246, President Johnson took further executive action. He issued Ex-
ecutive Order 11375, which amended Order 11246, and provided that
“[i]t is desirable that the equal employment opportunity programs
provided for in Executive Order No. 11246 expressly embrace discrim-
ination on account of sex.”177 Thus, via several executive orders it be-
168. Id. at 1010.
169. Id. at 1008.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1009.
173. Id. at 1011.
174. Id. at 1011–12.
175. Id. at 1012–13.
176. See Rose, supra note 157, at 1143.
177. Exec. Order No. 11375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (Oct. 13, 1967).
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came evident that the Executive Branch had an important
responsibility to ensure equal employment opportunities, which even-
tually led to the creation of the President’s Committee on Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity.178 It carried out this duty by using the power
of executive orders along with Title VII to topple the gender and race
barriers that blocked access to private sector jobs and government
contract work for many minorities.179 Order No. 11246 was a major
progressive victory for racial minorities because it spearheaded equal
access to a category of private sector jobs free from society’s pervasive
racial stereotypes that underpinned employment opportunities for
decades.
3. Title VII-Related Executive Orders Post-Contractors
The vast success of desegregating the trade unions is directly at-
tributable to the unilateral executive actions taken to effectuate equal
employment within private sector contract work, as well as the out-
come in Contractors. After the Third Circuit upheld the legality of ex-
ecutive orders in the context of Title VII,180 President Nixon
continued to build on the legacies of Executive Order 11246 and Con-
tractors by prohibiting federal civilian workforce discrimination with
Executive Order 11478.181 President Nixon signed Executive Order
11478 on August 8, 1969.182 Order 11478 further extended federal
non-discriminatory hiring and employment protections by mandating
federal agencies to establish programs of equal employment
opportunity.183
Specifically, Section Two of Executive Order 11478 mandated
federal agencies to “assure participation at the local level with other
employers, schools, and public or private groups in cooperative efforts
to improve community conditions which affect employability.”184 In
addition, Order 11478 furthered the use of executive orders as a pow-
erful tool to provide broader employment equality in federal jobs be-
cause it called for affirmative action programs for minority applicants
to federal jobs.185 As such, Order 11478 furthered the goals of Title
178. See Rose, supra note 157, at 1125.
179. Id. at 1125–26, 1141–43.
180. Id. at 1143.
181. Executive Order 11478, WIKIPEDIA.COM (last visited Jan. 6, 2016), https://en.wiki
pedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_11478.
182. Exec. Order No. 11478, 34 F.R. 12985 (Aug. 8, 1969).
183. Id. at § 2.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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VII by tasking the Civil Service Commission with the further weeding
out of discrimination in federal employment.186
Continuing the legacy of executive orders in the Title VII employ-
ment context, on Monday, June 1, 1998 the White House announced
President Clinton’s Executive Order 13087,187 which further amended
Executive Order 11478.188 Order 13087 added “sexual orientation” to
the list of immutable characteristics protected within federal employ-
ment and government contract work.189 President Clinton’s directive
made it unlawful for any federal agency to discriminate because of an
employee’s or job applicant’s sexual orientation.190 This executive ac-
tion was a big step for the LGBT community in the federal workforce.
Most recently, President Obama’s Executive Order 13672
amended Orders 11478 and 11246.191 Specifically, President Obama’s
Order 13672 extended sexual orientation and gender identity protec-
tions for the federal civilian workforce as well as to those employees
subject to government contract work.192 While Order 13672 has been
celebrated as a victory for the LGBT community, the current levels of
private sector employment discrimination suffered by gays, lesbians,
and transgender persons is directly analogous to the struggles of Afri-
can-American skilled trade workers in the 1940s. The ever-evolving so-
cial-political climate that once demanded equal employment
opportunities and desegregated war defense industries for African-
Americans during World War II now demands similar outcomes for
the LGBT community in private workspaces.
III. The Solution: How Issuance of an Executive Order Can
Effectuate Equal Title VII Protections for All LGBT
Employees
The current political atmosphere coupled with hesitancy by the
federal courts suggests that a properly drafted executive order can
186. Captain Marilyn H. David, A Title VII Cause of Action for the Sexually Harassed Federal
Employee?, 23 A.F. L. REV. 254, 268 (1982) (discussing the availability of Title VII to federal
employees in part due to President Nixon’s signing of Executive Order 11478, which fur-
thered the reliance on presidential actions in order to broaden the overall effectiveness of
Title VII).
187. Exec. Order No. 13087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30097 (May 28, 1998).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. L. Camille He´bert, Prevalence of employment discrimination based on sexual orientation
and gender identity, 2 Empl. Privacy Law § 9:4 (2016).
191. Exec. Order No. 13672, supra note 46.
192. Id.; see, also Sexual orientation or gender identity as basis for protection under federal dis-
crimination laws, 5 Emp. Coord. Employment Practices § 6:2 (updated Oct., 2016).
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fully integrate LGBT employees under Title VII. There are several rea-
sons why such an order would be both judicially and historically effec-
tive, and would send a critical political message to both public and
private actors about LGBT rights. As with any other president, the ex-
ecutive has the inherent duty to lead the nation in times of social ine-
quality in an attempt to satisfy full economic integration for all
persons, which includes every minority group that yearns for equal
protection under Title VII.
A. The Chief Executive Should Continue the Executive Order
Tradition Sparked by President Roosevelt to Provide
Full Civil Rights Employment Protections For All
LGBT Workers
Simply by following the pattern of Executive Branch civil rights
legislation first initiated by President Roosevelt in 1941, the chief ex-
ecutive has the inherent responsibility to “take care” that the nation’s
law be “faithfully executed.”193 Moreover, the chief executive also has
the prerogative as the chief administrator to use the Executive Branch
to lead the United States into a more perfect union. Thereby, the
chief executive can lawfully exercise his aggregated powers to issue an
executive order to prohibit further LGBT discrimination in private
workplaces. Just as President Johnson followed President Roosevelt’s
lead and spearheaded the EEOC as the successor in interest to the
FEPC under Order 11246,194 the chief executive is surely supported
by decades of executive orders in the civil rights employment context
to effectuate the changes that LGBT employees in the private sector
demand.
Currently, the LGBT community suffers from the same pervasive
discriminatory impacts as the African-American trade workers suffered
in the 1940s when President Roosevelt founded the FEPC.195 From
the decisions in Midwest Oil Co.196 and Contractors197 it is clear that the
chief executive has inherent legislative power, separate from Con-
gress’ ability to pass laws, that enables the Executive Branch to set
national policy goals through executive interpretation of laws codified
by the legislature. Any such executive order would continue to fulfill
the president’s role as the chief political leader of our nation.
193. See Noyes, supra note 53.
194. See Duncan, supra note 1.
195. See Ontiveros, supra note 120, at 1178–79.
196. See Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 465.
197. See Contractors, 311 F.Supp. at 1009–11.
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Within the chief executive’s inherent ability to exercise such
unique unilateral powers, the Executive Branch indeed plays a critical
role in signaling society’s demands for broader interpretations of pro-
gressive statutes like Title VII. Society now demands equal protection
for the LGBT community under Title VII. In response, the chief exec-
utive is well within constitutional and statutory bounds to issue such
an executive order to weed out private sector LGBT-based workplace
discrimination as outlined in Part I. This proposed solution would re-
affirm the chief executive’s role in defining the law as understood by
normative judicial and legislative traditions.
Undoubtedly, the president’s inherent constitutional and politi-
cal powers may lawfully converge under the relevant holdings out-
lined above to effectuate full private sector LGBT-based employment
protections that include both sexual orientation and gender identity
prohibitions under Title VII. Similar to the outcome in Contractors,
federal courts would likely exercise judicial restraint and give broad
deference to the Executive Branch because “the denial of equal em-
ployment opportunity must be eliminated from our society.”198 An ex-
ecutive order that clarifies Title VII’s express prohibition on “sex”
discrimination would likely withstand a legal challenge and be distin-
guishable from the decisions in Youngstown and Reich. Such a “hands-
off” approach would not upset Congress’s intent to smoke out all
forms of invidious discrimination in both private and public
workspaces.
B. The Doctrine of Congressional Acquiescence Provides the
Chief Executive with a Presumption of Legality in
Regard to Any Executive Order Affecting Private
Employers
Furthermore, the doctrine of congressional acquiescence, other-
wise simply known as congressional inaction, provides a presumption
of legality that extends to any unchecked judicial or executive actions,
especially actions within the civil rights context.199 Congress’s contin-
ued failure to pass sweeping legislation, such as ENDA, seems to con-
fer an unofficial legislative intent in regard to gay rights issues under
Title VII. Even so, the legal inquiry does not simply end there. Con-
gressional acquiescence played a critical role in the Rehnquist Court
198. See Contractors, 311 F.Supp. at 1012.
199. See above-outlined discussion of the doctrine of congressional acquiescence in the
civil rights area, supra Part II; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 670–72 (1991).
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decisions because it influenced the Court’s reading of plain statutory
provisions.200 Considering some recent Supreme Court decisions be-
ing hailed as progressive victories,201 the modern Court seems that it
would be even more inclined to grant broad deference to the Execu-
tive Branch when addressing any claims that executive orders that ex-
tend LGBT-based Title VII protections to private workspaces are
unconstitutional.
More than fifty years have passed since President Johnson put Ex-
ecutive Order 11246 into action. That order was challenged in Con-
tractors and held to be lawful.202 In the forty-five years since, Congress
has criticized but never overturned any chief executive’s executive or-
der affecting equal employment rights related to Title VII.203 Legally
speaking, this long-sustained period of unchecked executive orders in
the Title VII arena makes such presidential actions almost indispensa-
ble. In any legal challenge to such executive action, as long as the
executive order that addresses LGBT discrimination protections in
private employment runs congruently with the larger legislative goals
of Title VII, federal courts are likely to side with the Executive Branch.
The most informative example of legislative acquiescence for this
Comment is Congress’ inaction to overturn through legislation the
central holding in Price Waterhouse.204 Thus, pro-LGBT cases like Price
Waterhouse provide tacit approval for broader readings of Title VII.
The EEOC’s recent enforcement actions of LGBT-rights in the private
employment sector205 further buttress this assumption.
C. EEOC Enforces Title VII Actions Based on Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity: Proof That Title VII Complements
Such an Executive Order
In addition to the doctrine of congressional acquiescence, other
enforcement actions lend further support to the legality of an execu-
200. Id. at 670.
201. The recent Supreme Court decisions covering gay marriage, abortion, etc, see e.g.,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
202. See generally, Contractors, 311 F.Supp, 1002.
203. Since the early 1940’s Congress has not expressly overturned any such executive
orders, even though it sharply criticized President Clinton’s Executive Order 13087, see
supra note 187.
204. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 245 (holding that Title VII covers gender stereotyp-
ing, which lends to a somewhat broader reading than traditional notions of sex).
205. What You Should Know About the EEOC and the Enforcement Protections for LGBT Work-
ers, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc /news-
room/wysk/enforcement_protections_lgbt_workers.cfm [https://perma.cc/UBX6-
LTKX].
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tive order solution. In recent years, the EEOC expressly held that pri-
vate sector discrimination against an individual because of that
person’s gender identity is sex discrimination and therefore runs
afoul of Title VII’s express proscriptions against sex discrimination.206
Part of the EEOC’s current enforcement strategy identifies Title VII
claims involving gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgender persons as a
priority.207 Thus, the EEOC recognized the strife of private sector
LGBT’s in the workforce and responded by committing its attorneys
to enforce Title VII protections for affected LGBT employees. In fiscal
year 2015, statistics show that 1,412 LGBT-based complaints were
lodged with the EEOC.208
Because the EEOC has made a clear choice to pursue LGBT-
based Title VII actions, this choice would further add to the legitimacy
of an executive order solution that expressly extends private sector
employment protections to cover sexual orientation and gender iden-
tity. As outlined above in Boh Bros., even the traditionally conservative
Fifth Circuit has been willing to allow broader readings of Title VII.209
Such cases illustrate the judiciary’s willingness to respond to norma-
tive interpretations of Title VII. This notion underpins the successes
of the above-highlighted executive orders beginning in 1941 with
President Roosevelt and the FEPC. The EEOC’s success in prosecut-
ing LGBT-based Title VII actions also serves to reaffirm the validity of
legislative inaction. The latest EEOC strategic enforcement plan sug-
gests that any executive order extending Title VII protections to all
LGBT employees would have the full effect and force as a traditionally
legislated law.
D. Why This Solution Is the Most Effective, Commonsense, and
Quickest Way to Render Equality to All LGBT
Employees Under Title VII
Not only does an executive order expressly covering private sec-
tor LGBT-based employment protection have legal and historical
foundations, such an order would be the most effective, common-
sense, and quickest path to render equality to all persons under Title
VII. This proposed solution would be the most effective answer mov-
ing forward. It would create a bright-line rule for employers and fed-




209. See supra Part I.A.
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current interpretations of sexual orientation and gender identity
claims under Title VII highlight the tension between society’s progres-
sive demands and the often-restrictive judicial interpretations. Al-
though cases like Price Waterhouse210 and Boh Bros.211 undoubtedly help
to further Title VII’s goal to eliminate all types of private discrimina-
tion by employers,212 federal courts continue to struggle with broader
statutory interpretations involving sex discrimination.213 The pro-
posed executive order is the most effective solution because it an-
nounces an easy to follow, bright-line rule that will afford greater
justice and protections for all LGBT workers in America.
As the above-outlined analysis suggests, several legal and political
precedents provide the chief executive with inherent constitutional
power and political capital to extend full Title VII protections to the
LGBT community. Furthermore, larger social-political underpinnings
are critically important to the proper legal interpretation of the con-
gressional intent behind Title VII. If the goal of Title VII is to weed
out disparate employment decisions and their impact upon racial mi-
norities, then courts should feel compelled to examine the current
civil rights landscape when interpreting discrimination claims. Similar
to the Constitution, which provides our most basic liberties and funda-
mental rights, Title VII was undoubtedly intended to wipe out soci-
ety’s widespread and pervasive discrimination from America’s
workspaces. As such, society and government must yield to Title VII
and its inherent judicial flexibility to confer real benefits upon large
sections of disparate populations. Thus, as society changes and dis-
crimination evolves, so too will the ways in which Title VII will need to
be applied by federal courts. Some legal scholars have coined Title VII
as a “super” statute.214 Fundamentally, the most critical feature of
super statutes is their ability to adapt to society’s needs over time. Of
equal importance to super statute effectiveness is the president’s use
of executive orders to signal policy shifts to the legislature and judici-
ary. Cases such as Contractors215 and Boh Bros.216 reaffirm the notion
210. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228.
211. Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 444.
212. David Michael McConnell, Title VII at Twenty—The Unsettled Dilemma of ‘Reverse’
Discrimination, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1073, 1075–76 (1983) (highlighting the enactment
and development of Title VII by discussing its purpose and goals).
213. See general discussion supra Part I.A, (highlighting the struggles of lower courts in
applying Title VII to gender stereotyping).
214. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1231,
1237–42 (2001).
215. Contractors, 311 F.Supp. at 1011.
216. Boh Bros., 731 F.3d 444.
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that Title VII is a super statute that has been honed over time through
a focused tripartite conversation among Congress, the Judiciary, and
the Executive Branch. Arguably the most integral voice in this conver-
sation has been the ability of presidents to signal societal demands
and effectuate these changes by adapting Title VII through the inher-
ent power of the executive. Just as the Constitution over time has
given rise to new fundamental rights like marriage and abortion, Title
VII was intended to be flexible enough to remedy evolving disparate
impacts in the workplace over time.
The proposed executive order is the best commonsense solution
given the current social-political situation. Amongst the national pleas
for immigration reform and the call for American troops to help
quash terrorism, most congressional representatives only have one
goal: to propel their party to the next political victory. Under any post-
Obama administration, congressional inaction on ENDA will likely
continue to persist. Many of President Obama’s legacies, such as
LGBT rights, will likely come under heavy conservative scrutiny. Be-
cause many practical implications continue to block equal Title VII
protection for many LGBT workers, the chief executive should act
unilaterally and accordingly. It is unreasonable to assume that the
EEOC and the federal courts will weed out all invidious discrimination
against LGBT workers. Just as President Franklin Roosevelt responded
to the calls from African-American trade workers in the South and
shipbuilders in the West,217 the chief executive needs to use the op-
portunity to reaffirm an inherently progressive legacy in the eyes of
the American people and issue such an order.
Finally, if the LGBT populace is forced to wait for the judiciary to
consider another seminal case like Price Waterhouse to receive needed
workplace protections, thousands of LGBT employees will continue to
suffer irreparable harms at the hands of private sector employers.
With all practical considerations on the table, if the LGBT community
is forced to wait another ten or twenty years for judicial action to effec-
tuate full Title VII equality, LGBT-based discrimination in the private
sector will eventually become unmanageable.
Conclusion
In sum, with the stroke of a pen, the chief executive has the
quickest, most effective, and best commonsense solution to effectuate
equal Title VII for LGBT employees across the nation. In our current
217. See Ontiveros, supra note 120, at 1178–82.
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socio-political state, an executive order is the most obvious choice to
weed out the continued strife of the LGBT community. Hopefully the
chief executive heeds the call of equality that links back to the actions
of President Franklin Roosevelt. Such continued preservation of exec-
utive orders to effectuate equal employment protections for the vul-
nerable LGBT workforce that continues to suffer discriminatory
impacts in private sector would likely pass any legal challenge. Perhaps
these orders will one day encourage Congress to pass much needed
legislation like ENDA. Until then, the executive order is the best tool
to smoke out LGBT-based discrimination in all of America’s work-
spaces, both public and private.
